How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”. I argue that he has done no such thing.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-12-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Skeptical Theism: New Essays.Dougherty, Trent & McBrayer, Justin P. (eds.)

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
345 ( #12,531 of 48,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #14,655 of 48,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.