Peirce on Grounding the Laws of Logic

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper is a contribution to the long-standing debate over the coherence of Charles Sanders Peirce’s overall system of philosophy. It approaches that issue through the lens of a contemporary debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding, or more broadly, the nature of metaphysical explanation, employing the laws of logic as a case study. The central question concerns how we can take seriously what we shall call Peirce’s Rule—that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable—without being vulnerable to a vicious regress or equally vicious circularity. I first argue that in Peirce’s early work he offers a quietist conception of grounding that provides a persuasive and ground-breaking answer to this central question. I then raise a familiar concern, that in Peirce’s later work we find hints of a more metaphysical conception of grounding that seems unable to answer that question and is thus inconsistent with his earlier work. The paper ends with a speculative interpretation of Peirce’s approach to metaphysics and its possible role in grounding logical principles.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-08-13
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
130 ( #41,765 of 65,735 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #61,361 of 65,735 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.