Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.

Author Profiles

Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University
E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville


Added to PP

2,238 (#1,983)

6 months
242 (#1,675)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?