Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564 (2006)
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Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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