Abstract

“Jury Nullification, Verdictal Asymmetry, and the Ultimate Logic of Anarchy” is a critical examination and analysis of the ‘anarchy objection’ to jury nullification, a common argument against informing juries of their nullification power. The anarchy objection posits that jury nullification leads to inconsistent verdicts (verdictal asymmetry) and, as a result, social anarchy and chaos. Through careful analysis, I argue that the anarchy objection is predicated on two flawed premises: first, that jury nullification promotes verdictal asymmetry, and second, that such asymmetry leads to anarchy. Such commitments are, I argue, empirically unsupported and conceptually misguided. Verdictal asymmetry is an intrinsic feature of the common law system, present at nearly every adjudicative stage, and not uniquely linked to jury nullification; yet we certainly do not live in an environment of jural/social anarchy. Finally, I discuss how the principle of treating like cases alike is primarily a procedural constraint, not a mandate for verdictal symmetry. By dismantling the anarchy objection, I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the jurisprudence surrounding the jury nullification debate and its role within the legal system.