In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby,
Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 101 (
2013)
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Abstract
Given certain well-known observations by Mach and Russell, the question arises what place there is for causation in the physical world. My aim in this chapter is to understand under what conditions we can use causal terminology and how it fi ts in with what physics has to say. I will argue for a disposition-based process-theory of causation. After addressing
Mach’s and Russell’s concerns I will start by outlining the kind of problem the disposition based process-theory of causation is meant to solve. In a second step I will discuss the nature of those dispositions that will be relevant for our question. In section 3 I will discuss
existing dispositional accounts of causation before I proceed to present my own account (sections 4 to 6) and contrast it with traditional process-theories (section 7).