Scientific Practice and the Disunity of Physics

Philosophia Naturalis 35 (1):209-222 (1998)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is my aim in this paper to look at some of the arguments that are brought forward for or against certain claims to unity/disunity (in particular to examine those arguments from science and from scientific practice) in order to evaluate whether they really show what they claim to. This presupposes that the concept or rather the concepts of the unity of physics are reasonably clear. Three concepts of unity can be identified: (1) ontological unity, which refers to the objects physics is about; (2) descriptive unity, which addresses the descriptive devices physics employs in dealing with physical systems (3) unity of practice, which deals with what physicists actually do.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HTTSPA
Revision history
Archival date: 2011-07-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-07-28

Total views
183 ( #23,216 of 50,438 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #34,733 of 50,438 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.