Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections

Theoria 79 (1):29-39 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open. More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why we cannot bring about certain states of affairs, it cannot explain what I call the “recalcitrance of nature”.

Author's Profile

Andreas Hüttemann
University of Cologne


Added to PP

633 (#27,736)

6 months
75 (#70,881)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?