Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory
Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621 (2013)
Abstract
Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I, I have first presented the AGM theory of belief revision. Then I have focused on the problem of iterated belief revisions. In part II, I will first present ranking theory (Spohn 1988). Then I will show how it solves the problem of iterated belief revisions. I will conclude by sketching two areas of future research.
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Archival date: 2014-07-09
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References found in this work BETA
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.Joyce, James
The Logic of Decision.Jeffrey, Richard
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Citations of this work BETA
Belief Revision Theory.Lin, Hanti
Ranking Theory.Huber, Franz
Full & Partial Belief.Genin, Konstantin
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2013-07-24
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2013-07-24
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265 ( #12,220 of 41,549 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #9,149 of 41,549 )
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