For True Conditionalizers Weisberg's Paradox is a False Alarm

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Weisberg introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory and for Dempster-Shafer theory. In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
ISBN(s)
1584-174X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HUBFTC
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-01-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Logic of Decision.Kyberg, Henry E. & Jeffrey, R. C.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-09-07

Total views
57 ( #29,453 of 39,604 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #21,614 of 39,604 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.