For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm
Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):111-119 (2014)
Abstract
Weisberg introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory and for Dempster-Shafer theory. In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
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1584-174X
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HUBFTC
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Archival date: 2017-01-06
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2015-09-07
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112 ( #36,800 of 56,912 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #34,185 of 56,912 )
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