For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm

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Abstract
Weisberg introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization, and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory and for Dempster-Shafer theory. In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.
ISBN(s)
1584-174X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HUBFTC
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Archival date: 2017-01-06
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2015-09-07

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