The groundless normativity of instrumental rationality

Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):445-468 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Neo-Humean instrumentalist theories of reasons for acting have been presented with a dilemma: either they are normatively trivial and, hence, inadequate as a normative theory or they covertly commit themselves to a noninstrumentalist normative principle. The claimed result is that no purely instrumentalist theory of reasons for acting can be normatively adequate. This dilemma dissolves when we understand what question neo-Humean instrumentalists are addressing. The dilemma presupposes that neo-Humeans are attempting to address the question of how to act, 'simpliciter'. Instead, they are evaluating actions from the agent's normative perspective.

Author's Profile

Donald Hubin
Ohio State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,019 (#14,015)

6 months
119 (#41,428)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?