A liberal realist answer to debunking skeptics: the empirical case for realism

Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1983-2010 (2016)
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Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.

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Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder


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