A paradox for weak deontology

Utilitas 21 (4):464-477 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Deontological ethicists generally agree that there is a way of harming others such that it is wrong to harm others in that way for the sake of producing a comparable but greater benefit for others. Given plausible assumptions about this type of harm, this principle yields the paradoxical result that it may be wrong to do A, wrong to do B, but permissible to do (A and B).

Author's Profile

Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-11-13

Downloads
3,368 (#1,866)

6 months
374 (#4,769)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?