Causation as simultaneous and continuous

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):556–565 (2003)
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Abstract
We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time
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