Compassionate phenomenal conservatism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55 (2007)
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I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one.

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Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder


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