Compassionate phenomenal conservatism

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Abstract
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
HUECPC
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Archival date: 2015-02-10
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2009-01-28

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