Consistency and evidence

Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338 (2014)
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Abstract
Williamson (2000) appeals to considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one’s evidence in order to motivate the claim that all and only knowledge is evidence. It is argued here that the relevant considerations do not support this claim, and in fact conflict with it
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Archival date: 2017-10-17
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