In what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue?

Synthese 198 (6):5883-5895 (2019)
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Abstract
In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.
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Archival date: 2019-10-21
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