Davidson’s Debt to Anscombe

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Abstract
Robert Myers’ interpretation of Davidson’s practical philosophy gets Davidson right in many fundamental respects. He rightly argues that Davidson avoids inconsistencies among internalism, ethical objectivity, and the belief-desire theory by modifying central elements of the Humean belief-desire theory, and that Davidson’s alternative legitimizes the extension of his interpretation and triangulation arguments into the practical sphere. But at a crucial fork in the interpretive road Myers loses his way. Davidson follows Anscombe down a different path, one that takes individual desires to be constituted in part by evaluative judgements.
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Archival date: 2020-09-21
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2020-09-05

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