The epistemic account of faultless disagreement

Synthese 197 (6):2613-2630 (2020)
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Abstract
There seem to be cases where A believes p, and B believes not-p, but neither makes a mistake. This is known as faultless disagreement. According to the epistemic account, in at least some cases of faultless disagreement either A or B must believe something false, and the disagreement is faultless in the sense that each follows the epistemic norm. Recently, philosophers have raised various objections to this account. In this paper, I propose a new version of the epistemic account and show how it can handle those objections.
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First archival date: 2020-12-20
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-20)
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