Husserl’s Phenomenological Standpoint

Journal of Philosophical Research 33:263-270 (2008)
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Abstract

Husserl’s phenomenology is not an attempt to answer questions about contingent fact and existence. Rather, it is an attempt to specify conceptual truths about phenomena. In particular, it takes no stand on the existence of other minds. Thus, any interpretation of Husserl’s answer to the problem of intersubjectivity as affirming the existence of other minds is mistaken.

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Peter Hutcheson
Texas State University

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