Counterfactual Fallacies

Humana Mente 4 (19) (2011)
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A widely accepted claim about counterfactuals is that they differ from strict conditionals, that is, there is no adequate representation of them as sentences of the form   . To justify this claim, Stalnaker and Lewis have argued that some fallacious inferences would turn out valid if counterfactuals were so represented. However, their argument has a flaw, as it rests on a questionable assumption about the relation between surface grammar and logical form. Without that assumption, no consequence of the alleged kind is obtained, hence the claim may be rejected.
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Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert C.
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David
Counterfactual Scorekeeping.Gillies, Anthony S.
Counterfactuals and Context.Brogaard, Berit & Salerno, Joe

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