Faultless or Disagreeement

In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 287 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘ faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without either A or B being at fault. But standard semantics has no room for such a case, so there is something wrong with standard semantics. The best way to amend it is to add a new parameter that is relevant to the truth or falsity of what A and B judge, presumably, something related to personal taste. The aim of the paper is to show that this line of argument is flawed. It is true that standard semantics has no room for faultless disagreements. But there is nothing wrong with this, for it should not be assumed that such disagreements exist
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-11-07
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
El pluralismo moral de David Hume.Arrieta, Agustin & Vicente, Agustin

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
550 ( #7,211 of 50,440 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #10,714 of 50,440 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.