Vagueness and Quantification

Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):579-602 (2016)
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This paper deals with the question of what it is for a quantifier expression to be vague. First it draws a distinction between two senses in which quantifier expressions may be said to be vague, and provides an account of the distinction which rests on independently grounded assumptions. Then it suggests that, if some further assumptions are granted, the difference between the two senses considered can be represented at the formal level. Finally, it outlines some implications of the account provided which bear on three debated issues concerning quantification.
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First archival date: 2015-10-21
Latest version: 2 (2016-06-20)
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