Modal Fragmentalism

The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):570-587 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity.
Reprint years
2020
PhilPapers/Archive ID
IAQMF
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-20
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-08-20

Total views
126 ( #38,265 of 2,439,679 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #36,735 of 2,439,679 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.