Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and behavioral psychology. The repercussions of the view for how we conceive of many ordinary instances of subjective probability, and how it relates to more traditional conceptions of subjective probability, are discussed in some detail.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ICASPA
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-02-12
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Vison.Marr, David
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul & Tversky, Amos (eds.)
Alief and Belief.Gendler, Tamar SzabĂł
Perceptual Symbol Systems.Barsalou, Lawrence W.

View all 69 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Normality and Actual Causal Strength.Icard, Thomas F.; Kominsky, Jonathan F. & Knobe, Joshua
The Psychological Representation of Modality.Phillips, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-08-21

Total views
1,723 ( #1,333 of 50,214 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
232 ( #1,622 of 50,214 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.