Basic Knowledge First
Episteme 14 (3):343-361 (2017)
Abstract
An infuential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for
knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and
justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought
in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for more specific category of basic knowledge.
Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally
are better suited for basic knowledge.
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2017-07-04
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398 ( #18,923 of 69,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #15,849 of 69,061 )
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