Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques

In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256 (2014)
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Abstract
A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. What bearing does the rejection of the centrality of intuition in armchair philosophy have on experimentalist critiques of the latter? I distinguish two very different kinds of experimentalist critique: one critique requires the centrality of intuition; the other does not.
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