A-Time Beats No Time. A Response to Brian Leftow

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):55--70 (2013)
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In this paper, I present a new argument against the compatibility of human free will and divine timelessness when conceiving of eternity in terms of an additional dimension as presented by brian leftow. The paper is organized as follows: After giving a brief sketch of leftow’s model, I argue that assuming libertarianism, free will presupposes presentism, since metaphysical indeterminism is only compatible with a presentist A-theory of physical time. Given this result, I make a case for the incompatibility of presentism and divine eternity modelled as a frame of reference, implying the incompatibility of the latter with human free will.


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