Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.
No keywords specified (fix it)
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-04-08
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Myth of Morality.Joyce, Richard
The Aim of Belief.Wedgwood, Ralph

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
86 ( #35,547 of 50,307 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #22,029 of 50,307 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.