A Quasi-Fregean Solution to ‘The Concept Horse’ Paradox

Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):7-22 (2015)
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In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’- Fregean in the sense that it rejects Frege’s claims about the ontological import of natural language and his analysis thereof.

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Mihail Petrişor Ivan
University of Bucharest


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