Pains and sounds
Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):143-163 (2011)
Abstract
I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests
a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve
perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed
metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with
shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage
and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical
proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being
animate, private, and self-intimating states.
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Archival date: 2011-10-30
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2011-10-24
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2011-10-24
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428 ( #17,477 of 69,040 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #40,571 of 69,040 )
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