A Better A-theory

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I present a new kind of A-theory. On this proposal, time’s passing is a metaphysically fundamental aspect of reality. I take this to mean that there are fundamental facts like: four hours passed from 8am today until noon. This A-theory also posits fundamental facts about the state of the universe at a given time, and about cross-temporal relationships. The proposed metaphysical package attractively articulates our pre-relativistic conception of time. I defend the proposal from a number of orthodox objections: fundamental facts need not be aspects of current reality (§2); our package can and should posit fundamental cross-temporal relationships (§3); it resolves the difficulty of choosing between ‘presentist’ and ‘eternalist’ A-theories (§4); it evades the so-called ‘problem of temporary intrinsics’ (§5).
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First archival date: 2022-01-25
Latest version: 3 (2022-09-17)
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