Deference and self-knowledge

Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180 (2000)
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Abstract
It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
ISBN(s)
0897-2346
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JACDAS
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Archival date: 2018-09-23
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