Husserl on Epistemic Agency

In The Husserlian Mind. pp. 340-351 (2021)
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In this chapter I aim to show that Husserl’s descriptions of the nature and role of activity in the epistemic economy of our conscious lives imply a nondeflationary account of epistemic agency. After providing the main outlines of this account, I discuss how it compares to contemporary accounts of epistemic agency and respond to some potential objections. In concluding I indicate that according to this Husserlian account of epistemic agency we can be said to be intrinsically responsible for holding the beliefs we do as well as for the absence of belief.

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Hanne Jacobs
Tilburg University


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