Minimalism and truth aptness

Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy

Mind 103 (411):287 - 302 (1994)

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Abstract

This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.

Keywords

Minimalism Truth-Aptitude Truth

Categories

Liar Paradox in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

Minimalism and Deflationism about Truth in Philosophy of Language

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DOI

10.1093/mind/103.411.287

PhilPapers/Archive ID

JACMAT

Revision history

First archival date: 2016-03-03
Latest version: 1 (2016-03-16)
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References found in this work BETA

How to Define Theoretical Terms.Lewis, David

How to Define Theoretical Terms.Lewis, David K.

The Deflationary Conception of Truth.Field, H.

The Essence of Expressivism.Horwich, Paul

Transcendentalism About Content.Devitt, Michael

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Citations of this work BETA

Metaethics After Moore.Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (eds.)

Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg & West, Caroline

Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.van Roojen, Mark

Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Wright, Crispin

The Moral Belief Problem.Sinclair, Neil

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