Minimalism and truth aptness

Mind 103 (411):287 - 302 (1994)
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This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.
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Metaethics After Moore.Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (eds.)
Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg & West, Caroline

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