Minimalism and truth aptness

Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy

Mind 103 (411):287 - 302 (1994)

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Abstract

This paper, while neutral on questions about the minimality of truth, argues for the non-minimality of truth-aptness.

Keywords

Minimalism Truth-Aptitude Truth

Categories

Deflationism about Truth in Philosophy of Language

Liar Paradox in Logic and Philosophy of Logic

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DOI

10.1093/mind/103.411.287

PhilPapers/Archive ID

JACMAT

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