Moral conditions for methodologically rational decisions

In Marek Hetmański (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Brill Rodopi. pp. 209–223 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their presentation undergoes phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of decision making.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-10-07
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
129 ( #29,039 of 50,210 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #8,150 of 50,210 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.