Moral conditions for methodologically rational decisions

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 111:209–223 (2018)
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Abstract

The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their presentation undergoes phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of decision making.

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Jan F. Jacko
Jagiellonian University

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