Moderate holism and the instability thesis

American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):361-69 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper argues that popular criticisms of semantic holism (such as that it leaves the ideas of translation, disagreement and change of mind problematic) are more properly directed at an "instability assumption" which, while often associated with holism, can be separated from it. The versions of holism that follow from 'interpretational' account of meaning are not committed to the instability assumption and can thus avoid many of the problems traditionally associated with holism.

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Henry Jackman
York University

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