Against Yagisawa's modal realism

Analysis 73 (1):10-17 (2013)
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Abstract
In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes out true. This is so even if Yagisawa accepts a paraconsistent notion of logical consequence, on which contradictions do not entail arbitrary conclusions. The second argument is independent of Yagisawa’s acceptance of impossibilia. It shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics of possible worlds is incoherent. Using ordinary modal reasoning, I derive a contradiction from Yagisawa’s account of possible worlds.
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JAGAYM
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Archival date: 2013-01-14
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Hyperintensional Propositions.Mark Jago - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):585-601.
Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.

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2012-11-14

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