Abstract
Originally published in Ton van den Beld, ed., MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ONTOLOGY. Kluwer. 2000.
Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that
determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies
fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility.
Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation
of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that
compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the legitimacy
of (pessimistic) concerns about the origination of character and conduct. On this basis I argue that
any plausible compatibilist position must concede that determinism has fatalistic implications of
some significant and relevant kind, and thus must allow that agents may be legitimately held
responsible in circumstances where they are subject to fate. The position generated by these
compatibilist concessions to incompatibilism will be called 'compatibilist-fatalism'.