Abstract

The Acceptance of the Stoic Thesis on Affections (Pathē) In this paper, I argue that the Stoic claim that one should strive towards having no affections (pathē) is a plausible and, moreover, true claim given the context of the Stoic thesis on affections (pathē) in relationship to their philosophy of the ultimate goal (telos) of life. Given the conception of affections (pathē) that the Stoics intended, the irrefutability that one should strive towards having no affections (pathē) is found in the Stoic conception of impulse (hormē) and of value (namely how affections (pathē) lack value). Further, in the Stoic philosophy, there is identification of goods, bads and indifferents, which is an important contributing factor to the plausibility of the thesis. Taken together, these lead to the coherent acceptance of the Stoic thesis on affections (pathē), specifically that the allowance of affections (pathē) should be avoided.