Cohen on Rawls

Social Philosophy Today 29:135-149 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
G. A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for claiming that the scope of principles of justice extends beyond the design of institutions to citizens’ personal choices. More recently, he’s also received attention for claiming that principles of justice are normatively ultimate, i.e., that they’re necessary for the justification of action guiding principles (regulatory rules) but are unsuitable to guide political practice themselves. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these claims as they’re applied in criticism of John Rawls. It argues that ascribing normative ultimacy to justice entails its application to personal choice. However, it also argues that if Cohen is right about Rawls’s difference principle being regulatory rather than ultimate, then his earlier claim that Rawls must extend it to personal choice on pain of inconsistency is refuted
ISBN(s)
1543-4044
PhilPapers/Archive ID
JOHCOR-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2014-03-22
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-09-04

Total views
1,443 ( #1,759 of 51,433 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
69 ( #7,336 of 51,433 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.