To Assist or Not to Assist? Assessing the Potential Moral Costs of Humanitarian Intervention in Nature

Environmental Values (forthcoming)
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In light of the extent of wild animal suffering, some philosophers have adopted the view that we should cautiously assist wild animals on a large scale. Recently, their view has come under criticism. According to one objection, even cautious intervention is unjustified because fallibility is allegedly intractable. By contrast, a second objection states that we should abandon caution and intentionally destroy habitat in order to prevent wild animals from reproducing. In my paper, I argue that intentional habitat destruction is wrong because negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. However, I also argue that the possible benefits of ecological damage; combined with the excusability of unintended, unforeseeable harm; suggest that fallibility should not paralyze us.
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First archival date: 2019-03-24
Latest version: 2 (2019-05-02)
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References found in this work BETA
Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights.Donaldson, Sue & Kymlicka, Will
The Theory of Island Biogeography.Macarthur, Robert H. & Wilson, Edward O.
Animal Liberation.Puka, Bill & Singer, Peter
Robustness Analysis.Weisberg, Michael
Wild Animal Suffering is Intractable.Delon, Nicolas & Purves, Duncan

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