Locke on Real Essences, Intelligibility, and Natural Kinds

Journal of Philosophical Research 35:147-172 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper I criticize arguments by Pauline Phemister and Matthew Stuart that John Locke's position in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similarities among real essences. On my reading of Locke, not only are similarities among real essences irrelevant to species, but natural kind theories based on them are unintelligible.

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