Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons"
Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523 (2000)
Abstract
In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
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0031-8108
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JRNCA
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2009-01-28
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1,169 ( #3,538 of 2,439,583 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #15,872 of 2,439,583 )
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