Moral Uncertainty, Pure Justifiers, and Agent-Centred Options

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Moral latitude is only ever a matter of coincidence on the most popular decision procedure in the literature on moral uncertainty. In all possible choice situations other than those in which two or more options happen to be tied for maximal expected choiceworthiness, Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness implies that only one possible option is uniquely appropriate. A better theory of appropriateness would be more sensitive to the decision maker’s credence in theories that endorse agent-centred prerogatives. In this paper, we will develop and defend a modified version of this view that allows for agent-centred prerogatives and supererogation as part of its verdicts about appropriateness.

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Patrick Kaczmarek
Cambridge University

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