Methodological Issues in the Neuroscience of Moral Judgement

Mind and Language 25 (5):561-582 (2010)
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Abstract
Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non-utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal-level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature
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First archival date: 2009-06-05
Latest version: 2 (2013-07-30)
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References found in this work BETA
Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements.Koenigs, Michael; Young, Liane; Adolphs, Ralph; Tranel, Daniel; Cushman, Fiery; Hauser, Marc & Damasio, Antonio
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Cushman, Fiery; Young, Liane & Hauser, Marc

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Citations of this work BETA
‘Utilitarian’ Judgments in Sacrificial Moral Dilemmas Do Not Reflect Impartial Concern for the Greater Good.Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A. C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel & Savulescu, Julian
The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement.Kahane, Guy; Wiech, Katja; Shackel, Nicholas; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian & Tracey, Irene

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