How rich is the illusion of consciousness?

Erkenntnis:1-17 (forthcoming)
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Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true – whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion – the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation – or a “sparse” illusion – the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I present this distinction and I classify the most influential illusionist theories along this line of divide. I then offer an argument against the accounts of the illusion of phenomenality in terms of sparse illusion.
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First archival date: 2019-12-17
Latest version: 2 (2019-12-17)
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