The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach

Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-19
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
264 ( #24,226 of 2,448,889 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #11,045 of 2,448,889 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.