The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach

Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135 (2019)
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I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
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Archival date: 2019-08-19
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