Realism, Antirealism, and Conventionalism about Race

Philosophy of Science 81 (5):1039-1052 (2014)
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Abstract
This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future.
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2014
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First archival date: 2013-11-11
Latest version: 22 (2014-12-03)
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References found in this work BETA
Against the New Racial Naturalism.Adam Hochman - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (6):331–51.

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Citations of this work BETA
Gould on Morton, Redux: What Can the Debate Reveal About the Limits of Data?Kaplan, Jonathan; Pigliucci, Massimo & Banta, Joshua
The Mind, the Lab, and the Field: Three Kinds of Populations in Scientific Practice.Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt; Giordano, Ryan; Edge, Michael D. & Nielsen, Rasmus
Introduction: Genomics and Philosophy of Race.Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt; Millstein, Roberta L. & Nielsen, Rasmus

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