An Inconsistency between Being and Time in Presentism

Ontological Researches 10 (19):131-160 (2021)
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Abstract
Presentists argue that only present entities exist absolutely and unrestrictedly. Presentism, which itself is a temporal analog of the modal doctrine of actualism, is an ontological idea about time and existence against theories such as eternalism, possibilism, and growing block theory. Thus, presentists deny the existence of atemporal or timeless entities and describe presentism as a version of the (A-theory), which makes a difference between present, past, and future. Also, presentists are not able to ontologically, justify the existence of some entities such as Socrates and the year 3000 in the past and the future and the relations involving non-present objects like ‘Abraham Lincoln was taller than Napoleon Bonaparte’. However, presentism is altered via the addition of an abstract four-dimensional manifold of ersatz time, which is a type of (B-theory) series, to identify all ontological entities and justify the dynamic world. This inquiry is an attempt to put a completely different perspective on presentism and, the result obtained that despite the new conceptualization of time, there is an inconsistency between time and being in presentism. Therefore, presentists have failed to determine the ontological identification of cross-temporal relations, reference and propositions, and truth-makers. Also, whatever the final outcome of the debate between presentism and other views is significantly eternalism, according to ersatz presentism, it is hard to make sense of the idea that things change from one moment to the next.
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Archival date: 2021-09-22
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