Contrastive knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89 (2003)
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We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David

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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Schaffer, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua
Knowing the Answer.Schaffer, Jonathan

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